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SHOULD THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT BE INCREASED?*

Donald R. Richberg t

T

HIS question, in its broadest aspect, may call for an opinion as to
whether the power of the federal government, delegated and limited by the Constitution, should be enlarged by constitutional amendment. The question, more narrowly construed, may be whether the
federal government should extend the exercise of its present, delegated
powers over more subjects of regulation and into more detailed controls
of American life and work.
Proposals to enlarge the existing federal authority range from the
passage of a child labor amendment to a comprehensive revision of
the Constitution for the purpose of completely changing our form of
government. It would be difficult even to begin the preface to an introduction to the study of such an issue in the time allotted to this
forum. Therefore, I shall undertake to discuss only the wisdom of an
increased use of the powers of the federal government under the present Constitution. Even that is a Mammoth Cave in which my brief
candle will shed little light. I shall not try to explore the deeper question as to whether any further powers, which are now reserved to the
states or to the people,1 should be delegated to the United States. But,
without arrogance of opinion, I will simply state my belief that the
present federal powers are adequate to meet our present needs.
Let us consider, first, the power to tax and spend in order to "provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
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States." 2 According to recent revelations of the Supreme Court, this
is not the constitutional grant of an unrestricted power to legislate for
the general welfare, but is a practically unrestricted grant of the power
to tax and spend for the general welfare, which necessarily includes a
tremendous power of indirect regulation. The Congress has a "wide
range of discretion" in determining whether legislation will promote
the general welfare, and "every presumption is to be indulged" in
favor of constitutionality. 8 Accordingly, under Justice Story's interpretation of the general welfare clause, which was finally adopted by the
Supreme Court in preference to the Madison interpretation, the power
of the federal government may be increased very greatly beyond that
now exercised.4
There is, however, one doctrine of restriction which waxes and
wanes according to astronomical changes in the Supreme Court. This
doctrine shone forth when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was held
unconstitutional, 5 but has been in eclipse since the constellation called
the "new" Supreme Court moved into the judicial zenith.
In the AAA case, it was held that the power to provide for the
general welfare did not validate an act which invaded the reserved
rights of the states; and the principle was laid down sternly that no
power granted by the Constitution "could be used for the destruction
of local self-government in the states." 6 If this doctrine could be
regarded as settled, it would also establish a principle limiting the
exercise of another great federal power-that is, the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states." 1
Regardless, however, of the uncertain authority of this doctrine,
it presents a fundamental issue concerning the wisdom of increasing the
power of the federal government; and at this point I propose to lay
aside any futile, discouraging effort to guess what limitations may be
laid down by the Supreme Court on the exercise of federal power.
In private practice, lawyers are often compelled to give opinions to
their clients, guessing at what the courts will hold. A good opinion is
almost as valuable-and unusual-as a good tip on the market. In times
such as the present, when conditions, opinions and political influences
change rapidly, it is very difficult to make reliable guesses as to the
2
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U. S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
Id., 297 U. S. at 66.
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at 67, 57 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
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constitutional limitations upon the powers of the federal government
which may become visible or invisible in the courts.
But in a forum of public discussion, it is not necessary or wise to
delegate our thinking processes to the members of the judiciary, regardless of their eminence or transient authority. Furthermore, it is
often a waste of time to speculate upon what the courts will rule until
we know what will rule the courts-which is frequently a force called
public opinion. So it may be a very good use of our time to discuss, and
to help formulate public opinion upon, certain fundamental questions of
public policy, such as:
I. Should we endeavor to maintain the principle of local selfgovernment, or is this an outmoded political theory?
2. If the principle of local self-government is to be maintained,
how far should the federal government extend its powers which necessarily interfere with and restrict the powers of local self-government?
3. If we cannot draw a clear line separating the desirable fields
of federal and local government, can we establish principles whereby
we can judge whether, in particular instances, federal powers should
be increased or diminished?
In launching a discussion of these questions, let me express a conviction that clear thinking is not promoted by assuming the answer to
a question and announcing it as the principle which should guide one
to the answer. For example, it was strongly declared by the unreconstructed Supreme Court of 1935, in a notable opinion which had a
brief authority, that "building is as essentially local as mining, manufacturing or growing crops." 8 But, in view of the interstate commerce
power which the federal government with judicial approval is exercising in I 940 over building, mining, manufacturing and growing crops,
you will observe that these activities are no longer to be defined as
"essentially local." 9 If it be desirable to preserve as much local selfgovernment as possible-which is my own conviction-then some better way must be found to define what matters are primarily of local
concern than a judicial assertion that they are "essentially local"which another court may deny with equal assurance and perhaps equal
authority the next day.
Perhaps we can find a criterion of judgment if we think of local
8

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 at 547, 55 S. Ct.
837 (1935), quoting from Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 64 at 82,
45 S. Ct. 403 (1925).
9
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S.
453, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938).
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government not as the original source of national government but as
the present means of decentralizing the national government. We
began the history of the United States with a grudging acceptance by
the individual states of the necessity of establishing some sort of
national government. As long as we maintain the attitude that a state
government is a cherished ideal and that a national government is an
unfortunate necessity, we will continue to make progress walking backward, with our eyes always fixed upon that which we are leaving, as
though it'were the objective toward which we are moving. Such crablike progress is slow, uncomfortable and uncertain. Foresight is a more
useful guide than hindsight.
We should realize today that we are primarily citizens of a nation,
that national unity is essential to our existence as a people, and that a
national government is the real foundation of our political life, even
though the foundation stones were once called "sovereign states."
But we are 130,000,000 people, populating a vast territory wherein
geography, climate, social traditions, differences of race and creed, all
create need for variations in political institutions and activities. Our
government must be decentralized to be effective and democratic. We
have the traditional machineries of state and municipal governments
through which the national government can be decentralized. They
should be used for that purpose, and they should not function as jealous rivals of the government that must be supreme and of which they
are a part.
But decentralizing a national government does not mean that all
authority should first be concentrated in the national capital and that
then provincial governors and legislatures should be established to
carry out the purposes of the central government. On the contrary,
true decentralization means that the people, as the source of all power,
should create national agencies with limited powers, and state and
municipal agencies with limited powers, should make each agency
responsible for meeting within its capacity those public needs to which
it is most immediately responsive, and should coordinate all these
national and state agencies into one government of the nation.
This is precisely what the people of the United States endeavored
to do in adopting the constitutions of the United States and of the
several states. But federal and state officials, jealous of their prerogatives-and supported by a die-hard tradition of state sovereigntyhave never undertaken to coordinate their public services. In such a
coordination of the governments of these United States, the conceded
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supremacy of the national government might seem to mean an increase
in present federal power. But, the actual result ought to be to restore
the earlier authority of local government; and to transform much of
the federal authority which has been recently exerted directly upon
people in the various states, into mere federal supervision of authority
exerted by state and municipal governments directly upon their own
citizens.
Up to this point, we have been considering the federal power to
regulate a peace-time economy; and we need not spend much time
today on the subject of national defense. The maintenance of an army
and navy, specifically entrusted by the Constitution to the federal
government,1° is a necessity of national existence. The state militia is
a wisely segregated state police force, available to the national government in time of need. 11 It should be well understood that when the
army and the navy are maintaining their activities throughout the
country, local governments have no control over such national operations. When, however, the individual soldier is not performing his
official duties to the national government, when he is acting as a private citizen, living in his home, or going about his private business,
he is the subject of local government.12
Thus we recognize the sweeping authority of the national government over men engaged in matters of national concern while they are
so engaged, and the complete authority of local government over
such men when they are not engaged in the work of the nation. Here,
we may glimpse a guiding principle, which is that every citizen of the
United States has a responsibility to, and is subject to regulation by
both national and local governments, but that even the predominant
character of his occupation should not subject him to an exclusive, allembracing regulation by the central government. That is a principle
which has not been safeguarded in many recent extensions of federal
power, wherein it has been assumed that if part of an activity in which
an individual or a corporation is engaged is subject to regulation by
the federal government, he and the entire activity thereby become subj ect to comprehensive federal regulation. 18
In the early stages of federal regulation of interstate commerce, it
U. S. Constitution, art. I, § 8.
Id.
12 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883). See also Fifth Amendment and Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 6 S. Ct. 148 (1885).
18 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1939).
10
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was a common assumption that federal control should be extended only
to instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as vehicles crossing
state lines, or to transactions which concern "more states than one." 14
But with the development of our industrial system, and the increasing
interdependence of communities and enterprises in many communities,
we have been steadily expanding our concept of the proper field of
federal power. Among many causes, special emphasis may be laid
upon three: ( r) the growth of large businesses of national concern
which cannot be effectively regulated by the uncoordinated powers of
local governments; ( 2) the increasing importance of unfair competition in commerce of national concern between enterprises operating
under the various standards of local regulation; (3) the increasing
distrust of corrupt and inefficiently operated local governments, which
has created a tendency to establish regulative power remote from immediate selfish influences.
We have been forced to face the fact that enterprises operating in
several states could not be effectively regulated by local governments,
not only influenced by sectional interests and varying political and economic theories, but far too often influenced by a desire to give local
industries a competitive advantage, or to induce enterprises to move
from other localities where heavier public obligations might be imposed upon them.
We have been forced to recognize that enterprises such as foodpacking 15 or clothing manufacturing,16 although located in a few states,
are matters of national concern. So we have employed the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce as the means of regulating many
activities, actually carried on largely or even wholly within one state.
Lawyers and judges have talked learnedly about "burdens upon," and
"obstructions of" interstate commerce, and the necessity of maintaining
a "free :flow" of commerce, when what has really been meant has been
that enterprises of national importance, essential to the well-being of
all the people, were of greater concern to the nation than to the inhabitants of a particular locality; and that they should be subject to
national regulation as to all matters not of purely local concern.
We have also found that interstate commerce, or let us say the
national interest, frequently suffers from unfair competition, which
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 1 at 194 (1824).
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397 (1922).
16 National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301
U. S. 58, 57 S. Ct. 615, 630, 645 (1937).
14

15
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may not be harmful locally but which may injure business as a whole.
For example, the establishment of a monopoly may actually benefit
the community from which it operates but harm all others and impair
the maintenance of a competitive economy.
We have come slowly to realize that the political economy of the
nation must be based on principles which are nationally accepted and
maintained. Several states could not attempt to establish a statecontrolled economy in the midst of others seeking to maintain an
individualistic, competitive economy, without disintegrating the nation.
Long ago, we found it impossible to remain a nation half-slave and
half-free, not simply because of a conflict in moral ideas, but largely
because of an irreconcilable economic conflict. For similar reasons, we
cannot maintain national unity without maintaining fundamentally the
same economic and political system throughout the nation. For all
practical purposes, the power of the Congress to regulate interstate
commerce can be asserted to maintain a consistent national economy,
without preventing such local experimentation as will not impair the
economic health of the nation.
But, throughout the processes of federal regulation, it is important
to maintain two limitations. First, federal regulation should not be
made the means of regulating matters which are not of necessary na.:
tional concern. Second, the agencies of federal regulation should be so
decentralized that publia officials, even when responsible directly to
the national government, will be, so far as possible, residents of and responsive to the sentiments of the communities in which they exercise
immediate authority. A fair example of such decentralization is found
in the federal judicial machinery, in which the judges and federal
attorneys are, in the main, members of, and to some extent, responsive
to public opinion in the communities in which they exercise authority.
A bad example is found in several departments of government which
operate almost entirely from Washington, and which exert local authority through roving officials who regard themselves, and are regarded,
as aliens in the communities subjected to their regulation.
Absentee control has not always been imposed. It has often been
unwisely invited. The tendency to turn to the national government
for a stern, impartial regulation of local affairs, in order to thwart
the corruption and favoritism of local officials, is a misguided effort to
correct the evils of self-government by destroying self-government.
When local inefficiency or corruption is not necessarily a matter of
national concern, there should be no strained attempt to make it a
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matter of national concern. When the good citizens of a metropolis,
unable to overthrow a corrupt political machine or to stop bad business
practices which are locally harmful, call on the federal government to
clean house for them, they surrender part of their right of self-government and do their share to bring about an inherently undemocratic
centralization of power.
There have been many ironic comments on the fact that the city
of Chicago was relieved of Al Capone, not by a local prosecution for
violating the laws of the state of Illinois-or even the ordinances of
the city of Chicago-but by federal prosecution and conviction for
income tax violation. But, please note that the federal government
acted properly to enforce a federal law and left it to the state of Illinois to suffer the shame of being unable to enforce its criminal law.
That is the way responsibility for law-making and enforcement should
be divided if self-government is to be preserved. I submit that the
preservation of self-government is more important in the long run
than the immediate saving of any community from the incompetence of
its own local government.
Anyone familiar with recent federal legislation will recall many
instances where the federal government has stretched its power over
interstate commerce into the regulation of many matters of essentially
local concern. This has been done partly by legislation and partly by
an extremely liberal interpretation of legislation by administrative officials and by judges so remorselessly "liberal" as to shrink from being
conservative enough to conserve democracy. Such activities may seem,
for the moment, to be demonstrations of "liberalism." In the long run,
they will be identified as serious and reactionary encroachments upon
the power of self-government.
After the foregoing general observations, our main question may
be divided into two questions which can be somewhat dogmatically
answered.
r. Should the power of the federal government over business be
increased? Certainly the federal power to develop and sustain thi:oughout the nation a coordinated but competitive economy should be increased. But what is needed is not an increase in coercive federal power
which may stifle private enterprise with political controls; but an increase in cooperative federal power, which may be exercised to protect and promote private enterprise and to create public enterprises to
meet whatever national needs cannot be served, either at all or as
well, by private action.
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2. Should the power of the federal government over living and
working conditions be increased? Certainly the federal power to relieve the economic distress of individuals and communities, caused
by weaknesses in our national economy, should be increased. But we
do not need an increase, but rather a decrease in those exercises of
federal police power that deny to state and municipal governments the
full exercise of that local police power that is the very essence of local
self-government.
Before I close my introduction to this discussion, let me return to
a fundamental question which was earlier asked: Should we endeavor
to maintain the principle of local self-government, or is this an outmoded political theory? Upon the answer to this question depends the
political destiny of America.
The permanence of our democratic institutions is threatened by
pressures from abroad and from within, under which we are being
compelled to develop a stronger government than we have heretofore
known or desired. It should be evident that the government of the
United States in the future must be able to preserve not only social
order but also economic order. The orderly society of the future must
be not only one in which violent interferences with personal liberty
are prevented, but also one in which the security of the individual is
preserved by maintaining a reliable economic system in which every
willing worker can earn a livelihood with at least a fair prospect of
bettering his lot by increasing the social value of his labor.
It is quite evident that the once attractive anarchy of an unregulated
competitive system is no longer tolerable. A nation cannot organize
a modern military defense without reordering its ec~momic system so
that things most needed wilI be produced first, and with efficient speed,
in adequate quantities and at reasonable cost. It is equally apparent
that vast unemployment and the tragic waste of human and natural
resources cannot be prevented, and that we cannot defend ourselves
against these internal forces of disintegration, unless we reorder our
economy so that the boasted values of our citizenship become a reality
to millions of people who do not now enjoy them.
The advocate of the totalitarian state is ready with his remedy.
Whether his inclination be toward communism, fascism or nazism, or
whether he inclines toward the development of some American form
of dictatorship, he is prepared to argue stoutly that the trend of world
affairs is driving us willy-nilly to establish an all-powerful central
government if we are to survive as a nation. Against this insistent and
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rising clamor, the defenders of democracy are relying far too much
on worn-out phrases, on threadbare promises, and on empty boasting
of the invincible force of democratic legions-that are, in fact, dissolving before our eyes. Democracy will be preserved, not by shouting
for it, or even by fighting for it, but by working to make it work.
We do need increased power in the federal government to
develop and to preserve a sound national economy. But at the same
time, we need to fight against any increase of federal power to order
our daily lives, to circumscribe our ambitions and to limit our essential
freedoms. Local government is a mighty barrier to the imbecile plans
of remote tyrants who have the conceit to believe that any mortal
ruler is equipped to play God and to pass judgment upon what are
the relative values of the infinite varieties of human desire, aspiration and effort. That is precisely what national socialists must undertake when they attempt to plan what and how much shall be produced,
where and how it shall be distributed, and what prices shall be charged
to consumers in order to pay the wages which superhuman wisdom
must find to be the just rewards of labor.
Men are capable of organizing manufactures to make the things
that people want. They are capable of organizing the distribution and
transportation of things that people want. Men can create an economic
system to produce and distribute the things that people want and, by
government controls, can maintain order in such a system. But human
wisdom cannot be trusted to determine what things people should
want, what things are good for them and, therefore, what should be
produced and distributed, or what is the worth of a man's labor to
another man, or the fair price according to which one man must sell
and another must buy. It follows that an all-powerful government, a
master-minded government, will always turn out to be a bad government.
To create and to maintain a strong government as the worthy and
faithful servant of a strong people, there are two essentials: First,
there must be a competitive system for the development and satisfaction of human needs and the distribution of the rewards of labo_r.
Second, there must be local self-government, whereby, when selfdiscipline fails and discipline must be imposed upon the individual, it
will be the discipline of his own community, composed of men like himself, with similar interests and problems, and a knowledge that whatever
they do unto others may be done unto them. The further government
moves away from its source, the less tolerable and the less reasonable
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become its compulsions. When we grant power to a central government,
we should grant it jealously, measure by measure, and we should watch
most closely those to whom such powers are entrusted.
Federal officers should be as anxious as we are not to extend their
authority one step beyond what is necessary. If they are true servants
of democracy, they will practice self-restraint. If the present authority
of the federal government should be extended, which seems desirable in
some directions, then at the same time many powers of federal officials
should be reduced. Vague grants of authority by the Congress should
be revised and definitely limited. Balloons of authority, stretched by
the executive and inflated by the judiciary, should be pulled down and
deflated. This would enable many public servants to get their feet on
the ground once more; and would relieve their anxious friends of a
growing fear that they will never return to earth and bring government back to the people as they once promised.
If, however, each desirable increase of federal power is to be accompanied in the future, as in the past, by an undesirable and unnecessary curtailment of the power of local self-government, then there is
a serious question as to whether we are making progress or losing
ground as a democracy. Certainly we do not move toward greater individual liberty by establishing more and more remote controls over
our daily lives. Certainly we do not move toward a sounder competitive
economy by strengthening the hands of public officials already outstretched toward federal management of the industrial system.
You ask: Should the power of the federal government be increased?
The answer lies in the answers to three other questions: For what purpose? By what means? In whose hands?
Throughout the nation, men and women are seeking the paths of
study and experience that may lead them to the answers to these questions. It is a search well worthwhile, for the correct answers are of vital
importance to the oncoming generations of Americans.

